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Abstract. A key aspect of industrialization is the
adoption of increasing-returns-to-scale, industrial,
technologies. Two other, well-documented aspects are
that industrial technologies are adopted throughout
intermediate-input chains and that they use intermediate
inputs intensively relative to the technologies they
replace. These features of industrial technologies
combined imply that countries with access to similar
technologies may have very different levels of
industrialization and income, even if the degree of
increasing returns to scale at the firm level is relatively
small. Furthermore, a small improvement in the
productivity of industrial technologies can trigger full-
scale industrialization and a large increase in income.
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It is often maintained that many countries have achieved high levels of aggregate income
through industrialization, and that the main aspect of industrialization is the widespread
adoption of increasing-returns-to-scale, industrial, technologies. A prominent
formulation of this view can be found in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), whose
theoretical analysis focuses on the adoption of industrial technologies in final-goods
production only. Their conclusions confirm Fleming’s (1955) argument that this narrow
view of industrialization alone can neither explain why countries with access to similar
technologies may have very different levels of industrialization and income, nor why a
small improvement in industrial technologies may trigger full-scale industrialization and
a large increase in income. Furthermore, their analysis yields that the increase in
aggregate income that can be explained by this view of industrialization is smaller than
the productivity-increase at the firm level. This upper bound makes it difficult to
attribute high levels of income to industrialization as empirical evidence suggests that
increasing returns at the firm level are relatively small.
1
Two other, well-documented aspects of industrialization are that industrial
technologies are adopted throughout intermediate-input chains in the economy, and that
industrial technologies use intermediate inputs intensively relative to the technologies
they replace. For example, one of the empirical regularities found in Chenery, Robinson,
and Syrquin (1986)—the most detailed comparative study of industrialization
available—is that intermediate inputs’ share of the value of manufacturing production
increases with industrialization. For example, their data show that this share tripled
between 1956 and 1971 in Taiwan and rose rapidly with industrialization in Israel,
                                                  
1 See Bresnahan (1989) and Roberts and Tybout (1996). Relatively small increasing returns to
scale at the firm level are one of the reasons why, starting with Marshall (1890) and Young
(1928), external returns (technological or linked to the specialization of industries) have been
advanced as an explanation for the large effect of industrialization on aggregate income.2
Japan, and South Korea. Intermediate inputs’ share of the value of total production also
increased with industrialization in these countries. In Taiwan, it grew by approximately
one percent annually and reached 61 percent in 1971. Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin
also observe that during their sample period intermediate-input use in both Taiwan and
South Korea became similar to the pattern in more industrialized Japan, where 100
dollars of final demand in 1970 generated more than 80 dollars in intermediate-input
demand. Their empirical analysis yields that the increase in the intermediate-input
intensity of production during industrialization is mostly driven by changes in
technology, although changes in final-goods demand also play a role. Furthermore, their
data show that during industrialization productivity increases throughout input chains
and that input-output matrices become much less sparse as sectors become more
interdependent.
The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of industrialization that incorporates
these two aspects of industrial technologies and re-examine the conclusions from the
narrow view of industrialization (as adoption of industrial technologies in final-goods
production only). Three main results emerge. First, if industrial technologies are
intermediate-input intensive, then industrialization will have large effects on aggregate
income and productivity, even if the degree of increasing returns to scale at the firm
level is relatively small. This is because industrial technologies are adopted throughout
input chains in the economy. The increase in aggregate productivity will therefore
consist not only of the productivity-increase in final-goods production, but also the
cumulated productivity-increase in the production of intermediate inputs used to
produce final goods, of intermediate inputs used to produce intermediate inputs to
produce final goods, and so on. Intermediate-input-intensive industrial technologies and
input chains therefore provide a way to reconcile large effects of industrialization on
aggregate income with relatively minor increasing returns to scale at the firm level. The
second result of the analysis is that if industrial technologies are intermediate-input
intensive relative to the technologies they replace, then industrializing firms may raise
aggregate income even if they make a loss—giving rise to a positive aggregate-income
externality. This is because they increase profits of their intermediate-input suppliers3
and, through their suppliers’ input demand, profits of their suppliers’ suppliers, and so
on. The third and main result of the paper is that if industrial technologies are sufficiently
more intermediate-input intensive than the technologies they replace, then minor
differences in the productivity of industrial technologies may be associated with large
differences in equilibrium levels of industrialization, aggregate income, and aggregate
productivity. Furthermore, a small improvement in the productivity of industrial
technologies may trigger full-scale industrialization and a large increase in aggregate
income and productivity. This will be the case even if industrial firms coordinate the
adoption of industrial technologies.
2 Related Literature
The discussion of the role of input chains for industrialization dates back to Fleming’s
(1955) criticism of Nurkse (1952) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Nurkse and
Rosenstein-Rodan argue that the adoption of industrial technologies in the production of
final goods could increase aggregate income even if the firms adopting these
technologies were to make a loss. They also maintain that this could result in horizontal
demand linkages among final-good producers, creating the need for coordinated
adoption of industrial technologies—the big push—for industrialization to be profitable
at the individual firm level. Fleming’s point is that final-good firms adopting industrial
technologies and making a loss will always subtract from, not add to, aggregate income
under full-employment. Thus, if uncoordinated adoption of industrial technologies were
unprofitable at the individual firm level, then coordinated adoption would neither be
profitable for individual firms nor socially desirable. Fleming goes on to argue that
vertical demand linkages that arise along input chains in the economy could however
prevent socially desirable adoption of industrial technologies. Scitovsky (1954) and
Hirschman (1958) make similar points.
A formal analysis of Fleming’s argument about the role of horizontal demand
linkages for the big push can be found in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1989) analysis
of industrialization. They first show that the narrow view of industrialization alone
implies that equilibria are unique and socially efficient. As a result, the big push will not
lead to equilibrium industrialization. Intuitively, this is because profits are the only4
channel of linkages in this case. They then extend their benchmark model to three
mechanisms that give rise to multiple equilibria and therefore introduce a role for the big
push: the industrial wage-premium asserted by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943); an
intertemporal mechanism based on the timing of investment and cash flow; and the
possibility of a large infrastructure investment that reduces industrial firms’ cost of
production. One of the ways to think of the present paper is as proposing an empirically
motivated, alternative mechanism for the big push—although the main results do not
rely on the existence of multiple equilibria.
The role of vertical linkages for economic development has been analyzed in
Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996). They show how market structure
and specialization in the intermediate-inputs sector can generate vertical linkages with
the final-goods sector and result in multiple equilibria because of coordination failure.
2
Neither input chains nor the intermediate-input intensity of industrial technologies play
any role in their analysis however. Most closely related to the present paper are
Fafchamps and Helms (1996) and Gans (1997, 1998a,b). They discuss the role of input
chains and the intermediate-input intensity of industrial technologies for industrialization
in open economies and in dynamic economies respectively, building on earlier versions
of the present paper (Ciccone (1993a,b)).
3 Industrialization with Input Chains
The model of industrialization has two key features. First, each good can be produced
with a constant-returns-to-scale or an increasing-returns-to-scale technology. The
adoption of increasing-returns-to-scale technologies is referred to as industrialization.
Second, production of all goods but one with the increasing-returns-to-scale technology
requires intermediate inputs. This gives rise to input chains: goods are produced with
intermediate inputs that are themselves produced with intermediate inputs.
                                                  
2 Their argument is related to Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1989) infrastructure model where
linkages also arise (indirectly) through lower costs of production. See Matsuyama (1995) for a
review of models of multiple equilibria in economic development. The economic geography
literature also analyzes vertical linkages, see Venables (1995, 1996) and Puga and Venables
(1996). Puga and Venables consider a numerical multi-sector model to analyze the geographic
spread of industry induced by technological change. The approach and context is very different
from this paper and the aforementioned industrialization literature however.5
3.1 The Economic Environment
The commodities in the model are labor and a measure one of goods that can be
consumed or used as inputs in production. All goods can be produced with two
technologies: a constant-returns-to-scale, pre-industrial technology (PIT) and an
increasing-returns-to-scale, industrial technology (IT). The PIT uses labor only and
requires one unit of labor for each unit of output produced. Formally  ()()
PP ymlm =  for
all  [0,1] m ˛  where  ()
P ym  denotes production of good m  and  ()
P lm  the amount of
labor used to produce good m  with the PIT.
Production of good  0 m =  with the IT also requires labor only. The IT is
(0)(1/)max(0),0
II ylf q =- Øø ºß  where  (0)
I l is the amount of labor used to produce
good  0 m =  with the IT, and  f  is the fixed input requirement of industrial production.
It will be assumed throughout that 01 q <<  and  0 f > . Hence, the IT for  0 m =  is
subject to increasing returns to scale and more efficient at the margin than the
corresponding PIT. Production of all goods  0 m >  with the IT requires labor and goods
i  ranked strictly lower than m . The production function is
[ ] ()(1/)max(),0
I ymxmf q =-  where  () xm  is a generalized input produced according
to
log()loglog()(1)log()
I xmBzmlm bb =++- ,   01 b << , (1)
where loglog(1)log(1) B bbbb =---- to ensure that all industrial firms have the
same marginal cost of production in equilibrium. Intermediate inputs enter production
with the IT through the intermediate-input composite  () zm , which is produced with all








where  (,) xim  is the quantity of good i  used as input in the (industrial) production of
good m . This specification of the intermediate-input composite eliminates increasing
returns to specialization as defined in Ethier (1982). To see this assume that all
intermediate inputs can be purchased at the same price ( p ). Then (2) implies that the
production of intermediate-input composites relative to the cost of inputs is the same
(1/ p ) in all sectors. Increasing returns to specialization would imply that production6
relative to the cost of inputs should be greater in sectors that use a larger variety of
intermediate inputs.
The fact that production of each good  0 m >  with the IT requires all goods i
ranked strictly lower than m  gives rise to a triangular input-requirement structure. This
structure is chosen because it is the simplest structure that gives rise to input chains
while avoiding circular input-requirements.
3 Goods ranked lower than m  will be
referred to as goods produced upstream of m  and goods ranked higher as goods




log() Ucmdm = ￿ . (3)
Each household is endowed with one unit of labor and there is a measure L  of
households in the economy.
There is a continuum of firms with access to the PIT to produce each good.
These firms will be referred to as pre-industrial firms. The IT to produce each good is
available to only one firm, referred to as industrial firm, and each industrial firm
produces one good only. Both pre-industrial and industrial firms take prices in input
markets as given. Different goods will be thought of as produced in different sectors.
Sectors where production is undertaken by industrial (pre-industrial) firms will be
referred to as industrial (pre-industrial) sectors. The assumed market structure implies
that there is perfect competition among pre-industrial firms and that industrial firms set
prices to maximize profits in their sector.
3.2 Definition of Equilibrium and Equilibrium Prices
Equilibria are defined by the following conditions:
                                                  
3 Setting up the model following the differentiated-input business-cycle literature by assuming
that each intermediate input uses all other intermediate inputs in production (see Basu (1995) for
example) would imply that, for any two intermediate inputs, the first input is required to produce
the second and the second to produce the first. Production in such a model is a logical
contradiction and it is therefore unclear what can be learnt from it.7
(I) The quantities of goods demanded by households maximize utility given prices of
all goods and households’ income.
(II) The quantities of goods produced in pre-industrial sectors and the quantities of
labor these sectors demand are profit-maximizing choices of pre-industrial firms
given the wage and prices of all goods.
(III) The prices of goods produced in industrial sectors and the quantities of inputs
these sectors demand are profit-maximizing choices of industrial firms given the
wage, upstream prices, downstream input-demand functions, and the
consumption-demand function.
(IV) Industrial firms in industrial sectors do not make losses, and industrial firms in
pre-industrial sectors would make losses if they were to produce.
(V)  Quantities produced in each sector are equal to quantities demanded.
The assumptions about technology and preferences in (1)-(3) combined with the
market structure imply that prices of all goods, whether they are produced in industrial
or pre-industrial sectors, are identical in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Prices of all goods are identical in equilibrium. Choosing labor as numeraire
therefore implies that  *()1 pm =  for  [0,1] m ˛  where  () pm  is the price of good m  and
asterisks denote equilibrium values.
Proof: The assumptions about technology and preferences in (1)-(3) imply that
industrial firms face unit-elastic consumption-demand and input-demand functions.
Hence, profit-maximization by industrial firms implies that—if industrial firms produce
at all—they will set the largest price at which they cannot be undercut by pre-industrial
firms in the same sector (assuming that consumers and producers buy from industrial
firms at equal prices). The largest price at which industrial firms cannot be undercut is
the marginal cost of production of pre-industrial firms. Pre-industrial firms transform
labor into output one-to-one, which implies that their marginal cost of production is
equal to the wage rate w . Choosing labor as numeraire therefore yields that all industrial
firms in industrial sectors will set a price equal to unity. The price of goods produced in
perfectly competitive, pre-industrial sectors will be equal to the marginal cost of pre-8
industrial firms, and hence also equal to unity. Thus, equilibrium prices are equal to unity
in industrial and pre-industrial sectors. v9
3.3 The Industrialization Decision
The production of the generalized input  () xm  in (1) is subject to constant returns to
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Combined with equilibrium prices  *()1 pm =  for  [0,1] m ˛  and  1 w =  this implies that
the average cost of producing  () xm  is unity. Hence, industrial firms that produce a
quantity  y  will incur a total cost of production  () yf q+ independently of the sector
they produce in. Furthermore, (1) implies that it will be optimal for industrial firms to
spend a fraction b  of their total cost of production to purchase upstream inputs.
Combining costs of production of industrial firms with equilibrium prices yields
industrial firms’ profits as a function of demand  y ,
  (1) yf pqq =--. (5)
Industrial firms adopt the IT if demand is large enough for profits to be positive.
The choice of labor as numeraire yields that the marginal cost of production of
pre-industrial firms is unity. Industrial firms’ marginal cost of production is  1 q < .
Hence, the marginal cost of production in pre-industrial sectors relative to industrial
sectors is 1/ q , which will be referred to as the relative (marginal) productivity of the IT.
Furthermore, the price relative to the marginal cost of production in industrial sectors is
also 1/ q . Table 1 summarizes the interpretation of the parameters of the IT.
Table 1. Key Parameters of the Model
Parameter Interpretation




> • Relative productivity of IT.
• Price/marginal cost in sectors adopting the IT.
0 f > • Fixed input requirement of IT.10
3.4 Aggregate Income and Sectoral Demand
Denote aggregate income when only the n  sectors furthest upstream have industrialized
with  () Yn . It will become clear later that if a measure n  of sectors industrializes in
equilibrium, then it will always be the sectors furthest upstream because they face the
largest demand and therefore earn the highest profits. Furthermore, denote total demand
for good m  when only the n  sectors furthest upstream have industrialized with
(,) ymn . Demand for good m  and aggregate income are linked of course. The fact that
equilibrium prices of all goods are equal to unity implies that households demand the
same quantity  ()() cmYn =  of all goods  [ ] 0,1 m ˛ . Also, the PIT does not use
intermediate inputs and the assumption that only the n  sectors furthest upstream have
industrialized therefore implies that goods mn ‡  are not demanded as input in
downstream sectors. This yields that goods produced in sectors downstream of n  are
demanded for consumption only and hence that
(,)() ymnYn = , mn ‡ . (6)
Goods m  upstream of n  are also demanded as inputs in downstream industrial sectors.
It turns out that the only difference between the demand for good mn <  and the good
just upstream of m  will be the quantity of the good just upstream demanded for
production of good m . Demand for each good can therefore be determined recursively.
To be more precise notice that (2) assumes that all goods upstream of m  enter
industrial production of good m  symmetrically. Combined with the result that all goods
cost the same in equilibrium, this implies that industrial sector m  demands the same
quantity of all upstream goods:  (,,)(,) ximnvmn =  for imn <£  where  (,,) ximn
denotes demand for good i  as input in the production of good m  when only the n
sectors furthest upstream have industrialized. Hence, the total cost of intermediate
inputs used to produce good m  with the IT is  (,) mvmn , as the price of all goods is
equal to unity in equilibrium. Furthermore, (1) implies that industrial firms spend a
fraction b  of their total cost of production on intermediate inputs. Hence, total
intermediate-input expenditures of industrial firms are  (,)((,)) mvmnymnf bq =+. The
demand for good im <  as input in the production of good mn £  is therefore linked to
total demand for good m  by  (,)((,))/ vmnymnfm bq =+ .11
Each industrial sector demands the same quantity of all upstream goods as
inputs. Hence, each industrial sector downstream of m  demands the same quantity of
good m  and the good just upstream of m . Consumers also demand the same quantity
of good m  and the good just upstream. The difference between demand for good m
and the good just upstream is therefore  (,) vmn , the quantity of the good just upstream
demanded for production of good m . Market clearing in each sector yields that for
mn <






+ =- . (7)
Demand is therefore greater the further upstream the sector.
Demand for each sector mn <  can now be determined from (6) and (7) as
(,)(/)()((/)1) ymnnmYnnmf
qbqb =+- . Demand yields profits in each industrial sector




YnLmndm p =+ ￿ . This aggregate income identity can be solved for























The next result proves that l  is the average amount of labor required to produce one
additional unit of each good  [ ] 0, mn ˛  for consumption when all sectors upstream of n
use the IT; l  will be referred to as the industrial labor requirement.
Lemma 2. Suppose that all sectors upstream of n  produce with the IT. Then the
average amount of labor necessary to produce one additional unit of each good
upstream of n  for consumption is equal to l .
Proof: Denote with  ˆ (,) ymn  the additional amount of good m  necessary to produce one
additional unit of each good upstream of n  for consumption. Using the argument behind
(7) yields that  ˆ (,) ymn  satisfies  ˆˆ (,)/(,)/ ymnmymnm qb ¶¶=- . Furthermore, using the12
argument behind (6) yields  ˆ (,)1 ynn = . Integrating these equations yields that
ˆ (,)(/) ymnnm
qb - = . The assumptions about the IT imply that each unit of output
produced with the IT requires  (1) qb - units of labor. Hence, the total amount of labor
necessary to produce one additional unit of each good upstream of n  for consumption is
0 ˆ (1)(,) 
n
ymndmn qbl -= ￿ and the average amount of labor is l . v
With this understanding of l  it becomes straightforward to interpret the
expression for aggregate income in (8). The denominator is the average amount of labor
required to produce one additional unit of each good for consumption if the n  sectors
furthest upstream produce with the IT and the 1 n -  sectors furthest downstream
produce with the PIT (the amount of labor required for each unit of output produced in
pre-industrial sectors is unity). The aggregate marginal productivity of labor in







Furthermore,  fn l  in (8) is the amount of labor required to produce the fixed input
requirements for the n  industrial sectors. Hence, aggregate income is equal to the labor
available after production of the fixed input requirement for all industrial sectors
multiplied by aggregate productivity.
3.5 The Industrial Labor Requirement
The two determinants of the industrial labor requirement can be readily identified from
(9). First, the IT’s relative productivity. Evidently, the greater 1/ q , the smaller the
industrial labor requirement. Second, the IT’s intermediate-input intensity. The greater
b , the smaller the industrial labor requirement. This is because the IT is not only used in
the production of consumption goods upstream of n , but also in the production of
inputs to produce these goods, of inputs to produce these inputs, and so on. Hence, the
industrial labor requirement also reflects the cumulated productivity-increase in the
production of inputs, which will be greater the more intensively intermediate-inputs are
used in industrial production.13
To see the determinants of the industrial labor requirement at work in a simple
example, suppose that there are only two sectors: an upstream sector and a downstream
sector. Both sectors produce with the IT and have incurred the fixed cost. What is the
average amount of labor necessary to produce one additional unit of both goods for
consumption? The amount of labor and upstream good necessary to produce one
additional unit of the downstream good are (1) bq -  and bq  respectively. The amount
of labor necessary upstream to produce one additional unit of the upstream good for
consumption and bq  units for downstream production is 
2 qbq + . Hence, the average
amount of labor necessary to produce one additional unit of both goods for consumption
is  (1(1)/2) qqb -- , which is decreasing in 1/ q  and b .
In an economy with a large but finite number of sectors the amount of labor
necessary to produce one additional unit of good  2 N ‡  when all sectors use the IT is






= W- ￿  is the average
amount of labor necessary to produce one additional unit of all goods upstream of N
(the industrial labor requirement upstream of N ) and  (1) q W= . Combining these
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(11)
for  2 N ‡  and  (1) q L= . Hence, if  (1) N l <L- , then  ()(1) NN l <L<L- . This fact
combined with  (1) ql L=>  implies that the industrial labor requirement  () N L
decreases with the number of sectors and tends to the industrial labor requirement of the
continuum economy l  as the number of sectors tends to infinity.
3.6 Determinants of Aggregate Income
It is evident that the increase in aggregate productivity and income implied by
industrialization will be larger the greater the relative productivity of the IT. The effect
of industrialization on aggregate productivity and income may however be large even if
the productivity-increase in sectors adopting the IT is relatively small. This will be the
case if the IT uses intermediate inputs sufficiently intensively.14
Lemma 3. Aggregate income and productivity in an economy where all goods are
produced with the IT increases with the IT’s intermediate-input intensity. Furthermore,
the difference in aggregate income and productivity between an economy where all
goods are produced with the IT and one where all goods are produced with the PIT
becomes arbitrarily large as the IT’s intermediate-input intensity tends to unity.
Proof: The easiest way to establish this result is by using (8) and (10) to determine
aggregate productivity and income when all sectors use the PIT and IT respectively.
          Table 2. Aggregate Productivity and Income
All sectors use the PIT All sectors use the IT
Aggregate Productivity 1 1/ l
Aggregate Income L / Lf l -
Notes: The table makes use of (8) and (10).
Hence, the effect of industrialization on aggregate productivity and income is larger the
smaller the industrial labor requirement l . Furthermore, the difference in aggregate
income and productivity between the economy where all goods are produced with the
IT and the one where all goods are produced with the PIT becomes arbitrarily large as
0 l ﬁ. The definition of the industrial labor requirement in (9) and 1/1 q >  yields that
l  decreases with b  and that  0 l ﬁ as  1 b ﬁ . v
A higher intermediate-input intensity of the IT increases aggregate productivity but not
productivity of industrial firms because the price of intermediate inputs does not reflect
the opportunity cost as upstream sectors are imperfectly competitive.
The aggregate productivity-increase implied by full industrialization 1/1 l -  is









Hence, input chains (01 b << ) magnify the effect of the productivity-increase in each
industrial sector on aggregate productivity. For example, a 10-percent productivity-
increase in industrial sectors translates into a 33-percent aggregate productivity-increase15
when the intermediate-input intensity is 70 percent. Table 3 gives an idea of the effects
of full-scale industrialization on aggregate productivity for reasonable values of the
intermediate-input intensity in industrial sectors.
4 For example, a 40-percent
productivity-increase in industrial sectors translates into an aggregate productivity-
increase of 100 percent if the intermediate-input intensity of the IT is 60 percent.
Table 3: Increase in Aggregate Productivity Implied by Industrialization
Intermediate-Input Intensity of IT ( b b )
Productivity-Increase of IT (1/1 - - q q) 0 50% 60% 70%
20% 20% 40% 50% 70%
40% 40% 80% 100% 130%
80% 80% 160% 200% 270%
Notes: The aggregate productivity-increase is 1/1 l -  where l  is defined in (9).
Actual economies produce a finite number of goods. Hence, it is necessary to
compare aggregate productivity in an economy with a finite number of sectors to
aggregate productivity in the continuum economy (assuming in both cases that all
sectors have industrialized). Aggregate productivity in an economy with  N  sectors is
the inverse of the industrial labor requirement  () N L , and aggregate productivity
relative to the continuum economy is therefore  ()/() RNN l =L . Table 4 calculates
() RN  assuming 1/1.4 q = and  0.6 b =.
Table 4: Relative Productivity with a Finite Number of Sectors
Number of Sectors 5 10 15 20 25
Productivity Relative to Continuum Economy 90% 92% 93% 94% 95%
Notes: Relative productivity  ()/() RNN l =L  is calculated using (9) and (11).
                                                  
4 For example, the average intermediate-input intensity of production in South Korea, Taiwan,
and Japan is between 50 and 70 percent (Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986)). The average
intermediate-input intensity in the US is around 60 percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis
(1996)).16
Hence, aggregate productivity in the economy with a finite number of sectors is only 10
percent lower than in the continuum economy even if the number of sectors is small and
input chains are rather short.
3.7 Aggregate-Income Externalities and the Industrialization Multiplier
The potentially large aggregate-income effect of industrialization makes it especially
interesting to ask if this effect is internalized by industrial firms. The first step to














making use of (8). The numerator of (13) is equal to the amount of labor saved in the
production of good n  and will be referred to as the direct impact of industrialization.
Industrialization’s marginal effect on aggregate income is therefore equal to the labor
saved in the production of good n  multiplied by aggregate productivity. It is
straightforward to show that the direct impact of industrialization on aggregate income
is also equal to industrialization’s effect on the profits of all industrial firms holding
consumption demand constant. Rewriting the direct impact of industrialization using (5)
yields











(,)(1)() nnYnf pqq =-- (15)
denotes profits of the industrial firm producing furthest downstream. Hence, there may
be an aggregate-income externality associated with industrialization as the adoption of
the IT may have a positive effect on aggregate income even if the industrializing firm
makes a loss.
5 This will be the case when the industrializing firm’s losses are smaller
than the increase in upstream profits owing to the increase in intermediate-input demand
by the industrializing firm and by industrial firms producing intermediate inputs for the
industrializing firm.
                                                  
5 Using (13) and (15) yields that this will be the case if  /(1)()/(1) fYnf llqq -<<-.17
It is clear from (13) that the total effect of industrialization on aggregate income
exceeds its effect on profits holding consumption demand constant. This is because of
what may be called the industrialization multiplier. This multiplier captures that the
direct impact of industrialization on aggregate income increases demand for
consumption goods and hence intermediate-input demand, profits, and aggregate
income. To derive the multiplier formally suppose that demand for all consumption
goods increases exogenously by one unit, and define  ˆ (,) ymn  as the implied increase in
demand for good m  assuming that all sectors upstream of n  have industrialized. Notice
that  ˆ (,)1 ynn =  as goods mn ‡  are demanded for consumption only. Furthermore, the
argument behind (7) yields  ˆ (,)/ ymnm ¶¶= ˆ (,)/  ymnm qb - and hence
ˆ (,)(/) ymnmn
qb - = . This increase in demand raises profits in each industrial sector by
ˆ (1)(,) ymn q -  and aggregate income by 
0 ˆ (1)(,)(1)
n
y mndmn ql -=- ￿ . As a result of
the increase in aggregate income, demand for all consumption goods increases by
(1) n l - , which generates additional intermediate-input demand, profits, and aggregate
income. The implied increase in aggregate income is 
2
((1)) n l - , which generates more






1 ((1)) nn l
- +- , is the total increase in aggregate income generated by
an exogenous one-unit increase in the demand for all consumption goods.
3.8 Industrialization in Equilibrium
There are two types of locally stable equilibria: pre-industrial equilibria (PI-equilibria)
where all goods are produced with the PIT, and full-industrialization equilibria (FI-
equilibria) where all goods are produced with the IT. Intuitively, equilibria are locally
stable if profits in industrial sectors do not strictly increase (decrease) with a small
increase (decrease) in the measure n  of sectors adopting the IT.
Lemma 4: There are two types of locally stable equilibria, PI-equilibria and FI-
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Proof: A PI-equilibrium exists if and only if no industrial firm would make a strictly
positive profit from adopting the IT when all sectors produce with the PIT, i.e. making
use of (15) if and only if  (0,0)0 p £ . This last inequality is based on the fact that if all
goods are produced with the PIT, then the industrial firm in sector  0 m >  makes the
same profit or loss from adopting the IT than the industrial firm furthest upstream. It
follows from (8) and (15) that  (,) nn p  is continuous in n . Hence,  (0,0)0 p <  implies
that there exists a  0 d >  such that  (,)0 pee <  for all 0 ed ££  and therefore that the PI-
equilibrium is locally stable. Furthermore, (13) and (14) imply that  (0)0 Y ¢ >  if
(0,0)0 p = ; hence, (15) implies that  (,)/ nnn p ¶¶  evaluated at  0 n =  is strictly positive
and that the PI-equilibrium is locally unstable. A locally stable PI-equilibrium therefore
exists if and only if  (0,0)0 p < . Combining (8) and (15) yields (16). A FI-equilibrium
exists if and only if no industrial firm makes a loss when all sectors produce with the IT.
Notice that if  (1,1)0 p ‡ , then the industrial firm furthest downstream does not make a
loss if all sectors produce with the IT. Furthermore, all industrial firms further upstream
face greater demand and therefore earn strictly higher profits than the industrial firm
furthest downstream. Hence, no industrial firm makes a loss if and only if  (1,1)0 p ‡ .
Continuity of  (,) nn p  in n  implies that the FI-equilibrium will be locally stable if
(1,1)0 p > . Moreover, (13) and (14) imply that  (1)0 Y ¢ >  if  (1,1)0 p = ; hence, (15)
implies that  (,)/ nnn p ¶¶  evaluated at  1  n = is strictly positive and that the FI-
equilibrium is locally unstable. A locally stable FI-equilibrium therefore exists if and only
if  (1,1)0 p > . Combining (8) and (15) yields (17). To see that all interior equilibria are
locally unstable notice that if  (*,*)0 nn p =  for  *(0,1) n ˛ , then (13) and (14) imply
'(*)0 Yn > ; hence, (15) implies that  (,)/ nnn p ¶¶  evaluated at  * n  is strictly positive and
that the interior equilibrium is locally unstable. v
                                                  
6 Equation (17) implies that there is a scale effect as a sufficiently large population translates
into full-scale industrialization. As pointed out by a referee, this scale effect would disappear
however if the fixed cost required for adoption of the IT was proportional to population.19
It is evident from (10) that aggregate productivity will always be greater in the
FI-equilibrium than in the PI-equilibrium. The same is true for aggregate income.
Lemma 5: Aggregate productivity and income are greater in the FI-equilibrium than in
the PI-equilibrium.
Proof: Aggregate productivity in the PI-equilibrium is unity and in the FI-equilibrium is
1/1 l >  using (10). Furthermore, (8) yields that aggregate income in the FI-equilibrium
is  / Lf l -  and that aggregate income in the PI-equilibrium is L . Notice that the
condition for the FI-equilibrium to exist in (17) can be rewritten as  // LfL lql -> ,
which implies  / LfL l ->  as ql > .  Hence, aggregate income in the FI-equilibrium is
greater than in the PI-equilibrium.  v
It can be shown using (17) that aggregate income in the FI-equilibrium relative
to the PI-equilibrium satisfies  [ ] (1)/(0)1///,1/ YYfL lqll =-˛ . Hence, aggregate
income in the FI-equilibrium will be at least  /1 ql >  times aggregate income in the PI-
equilibrium. The increase in aggregate income associated with full-scale industrialization
will therefore be similar to the increase in aggregate productivity if the productivity-
increase in industrial sectors is small. To get a sense of the magnitudes involved suppose
that the productivity-increase in industrial sectors is 20 percent and that the
intermediate-input intensity of industrial production 70 percent. Then the increase in
aggregate income associated with industrialization will be between 40 and 70 percent
(depending on  / fL ). If the productivity-increase in industrial sectors is 80 percent, then
full-scale industrialization implies an increase in aggregate income between 170 and 270
percent.
Lemma 4 implies that there always exists a set of structural parameters where the
PI-equilibrium and FI-equilibrium co-exist. In that case, industrial firms can raise their
profits by coordinating adoption of the IT if the economy is in a PI-equilibrium because
industrial firms’ profits are always strictly greater in the FI-equilibrium than the PI-
equilibrium (where they do not produce).
7 Lemma 5 implies that coordinating
                                                  
7 This also implies that the share of profits in income will be greater in the FI-equilibrium than in
the PI-equilibrium.20
industrialization would not only increase profits of industrial firms but also aggregate
income.
Proposition 1 summarizes the main result about industrialization.
Proposition 1. Minor differences in structural parameters may be associated with large
differences in equilibrium levels of industrialization, aggregate productivity, and
aggregate income if the IT is sufficiently intermediate-input intensive. This will be the
case even if industrial firms coordinate their industrialization decisions.
Proof: Denote the set of all structural parameters  (,,,) Lf sqb =  that satisfy  0 L > ,
0  f > , 01 q << , 01 b <<  with S , and the subset of structural parameters that satisfy
(1)(1)(1) Lf qqbqb --=-  with W . Notice that all w ˛W  satisfy (16). Furthermore,
denote the  th i -  element of  , sw  with  ,
ii sw  respectively, and the set of all structural
parameters s ˛S  that satisfy  { } max:1,..,4/2
iii swe -=£  for  0 e >  and w ˛W
with  (,) ew B . By construction, the structural parameters in  (,) ew B  are close to each
other in the sense that the maximum distance between any two structural parameters
does not exceed e . Furthermore,  (,) ew B  contains structural parameters that satisfy
(17) as well as structural parameters that satisfy (16) but not (17). Lemma 5 therefore
implies that  (,) ew B  contains structural parameters for which there is a unique PI-
equilibrium and structural parameters for which there is a FI-equilibrium. Lemma 4
yields that aggregate productivity and income is greater in the FI-equilibrium than in the
PI-equilibrium. Finally, Lemma 3 implies that the difference in aggregate productivity
and income between these equilibria becomes arbitrarily large for all sequences of w s
that imply  1 b ﬁ . The argument remains unchanged if industrial firms coordinate their
decision to adopt the IT. The only differences is that in this case the equilibrium is
unique (there will be a FI-equilibrium if and only if (17) holds, and a PI-equilibrium if
and only if (17) does not hold). v
To understand this result it is useful to first assume that there are no input chains
( 0 b = ). This case corresponds to the benchmark model of industrialization in Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989).
8 Their results therefore imply that if there are no input
                                                  
8 Equilbria are both unique and socially efficient in their benchmark model.21
chains, then the FI-equilibrium will exist if and only if full-industrialization aggregate
income exceeds aggregate income when all sectors adopt the PIT. Intuitively, this is
because the private marginal cost of production q  is equal to the social marginal cost of
production l  in this case. If there are input chains (10 b >> ) however, then the private
marginal cost of production q  is strictly greater than the social marginal cost of
production l . Hence, full-industrialization aggregate income must now be strictly
greater than aggregate income when all sectors adopt the PIT for industrial firms to
make a profit from the adoption of the IT.
One unsatisfactory feature of the model analyzed so far is that the PIT does not
use intermediate inputs. It is however easy to allow for the PIT to use intermediate
inputs and preserve all other features of the model at the same time. The extended model
has the PIT using intermediate inputs in the same way as the IT, with the only difference
that the PIT’s intermediate-input intensity is 01 a <£  while the IT’s intermediate-input
intensity is 01 b << . The appendix shows that the results derived for the case where
the PIT does not use intermediate inputs generalize if and only if the IT uses
intermediate inputs strictly more intensively than the PIT (ba > ).
3.9 The Role of the Industrial Technology
Figure 1 uses (16) and (17) to relate the existence of PI-equilibria and FI-equilibria to
the IT’s intermediate-input intensity b  and the inverse of its relative productivity q .
Figure 1. Full-Industrialization and Pre-Industrial Equilibria








































Notes: PIE (PI-equilibrium) and FIE (FI-equilibrium) denote values of q  and b  such
that (16) and (17) hold respectively.22
Notice that the equilibrium is unique for most values of q  as long as b  is small. In
particular, there will be a unique FI-equilibrium (PI-equilibrium) when the productivity-
increase in industrial sectors is large (small). As b  increases, the region with unique
equilibria shrinks and the region with multiple equilibria expands.
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate that minor differences in the productivity of the
IT may be associated with large differences in equilibrium levels of industrialization and
aggregate income. For example, one economy may have access to an IT that implies
uniqueness of the FI-equilibrium. Another economy with access to an IT that is only
slightly less productive may be in the PI-equilibrium. If the IT is sufficiently
intermediate-input intensive, then the difference in the level of industrialization between
the two economies will translate into a large difference in aggregate income. For
example, suppose that the IT used in the industrialized economy is 80 percent more
productive than the PIT and that the intermediate-input intensity of industrial production
is 70 percent. Then aggregate income in the industrialized economy will be
approximately three times aggregate income in the pre-industrial economy.
9
Furthermore, it can also be seen from Figure 1 that a small improvement in the
productivity of the IT may lead to a large increase in aggregate income. For example,
consider a pre-industrial economy in the region where the FI-equilibrium and the PI-
equilibrium co-exist. Suppose that an improvement in the productivity of the IT takes
this economy into the region with a unique FI-equilibrium. This will lead to an increase
in aggregate income even if the technological improvement is small, and the implied
increase in aggregate income will be large if the IT is sufficiently intermediate-input
intensive.
If industrial firms coordinate the adoption of the IT, then economies will achieve
full industrialization if and only if (17) holds. Figure 2 plots the equilibrium level of
aggregate income against the inverse of IT’s relative productivity in the case of
coordinated industrialization.
                                                  
9 These calculations combine that aggregate income in the FI-equilibrium relative to the PI-
equilibrium is  (1)/(0)1// YYfL l =-  and that (16) does not hold if the FI-equilibrium is
unique. The latter yields the upper bound (1)/ qq -  on  / fL . This upper bound can be used to
find the lower bound 1/(1)/ lqq --  on aggregate income in the FI-equilibrium relative to the
PI-equilibrium.23
Figure 2. Aggregate Income and Industrial Productivity
















































Notes: The figure assumes that the economy achieves full industrialization whenever a
FI-equilibrium exists.
Hence, there is a critical point where a minor improvement in the productivity of the IT
implies a relatively large increase in aggregate income (accompanied by full-scale
industrialization). The increase in aggregate income at the critical point will be large if
the IT is sufficiently intermediate-input intensive. To see this notice that the critical point
ˆ q  is defined by (17) with equality. Hence,  ˆ 1 q ﬁ  as  1 b ﬁ . Furthermore, aggregate
income when all sectors produce with the IT evaluated at the critical point is
ˆˆ /(1) f qq - . The increase in aggregate income at the critical point will therefore become
arbitrarily large as the IT’s intermediate-input intensity tends to unity.
So far the focus has been on the role of the IT’s relative productivity for industriali-
zation and aggregate income. The fixed cost  f  required for adoption of the IT plays an
equally important and similar role however. For example, a minor drop in the fixed cost
may trigger full-scale industrialization and a large increase in aggregate income. To see
this suppose that industrial firms coordinate their industrialization decision and hence
that the economy achieves a FI-equilibrium if and only if (17) holds. This implies that if
the fixed cost required for the adoption of the IT falls below the critical level
ˆ (1)/ fL ql =- , then the economy goes from the PI-equilibrium to the FI-equilibrium.
Aggregate income will increase as a result, and the increase in aggregate income will be
large if the IT is sufficiently intermediate-input intensive. To see this notice that
aggregate income when all sectors produce with the IT evaluated at the critical point is
/ L ql  and that  0 l ﬁ as the IT’s intermediate-input intensity tends to unity.24
3.10 Efficient Industrialization and Economic Policy
Industrialization is socially efficient if and only if aggregate income when all sectors use
the IT exceeds aggregate income when all sectors use the PIT, i.e.  (1) YL > . To see
how economic policy can play a role in achieving efficient industrialization, suppose that
the economy is trapped in the PI-equilibrium because of coordination failure among
industrial firms. In this case, economic policy can subsidize the adoption of the IT to
achieve the critical mass of upstream industrial sectors necessary for industrialization to
be profitable. This critical mass is implicitly defined by the lowest level of
industrialization  ' n  such that  (,)0 nn p >  for all  ' nn >  and can be determined explicitly
as  '((1)/)/()(0,1) nLf qqql =---˛  using (15)-(17).
10 It is straightforward to show
that the critical mass of industrial firms necessary for adoption of the IT to be profitable
is decreasing in the IT’s intermediate-input intensity. Hence, the greater the IT’s
intermediate-input intensity, the smaller the number of sectors that need to be
subsidized.
Economic policy also plays a role for efficient industrialization when industrial
firms coordinate the adoption of the IT. Coordination implies that the economy will
achieve full industrialization if and only if  (1,1)(1)(1)0 Yf pqq =--> , i.e.  (1)(/) YL ql >
making use of (8). The private marginal cost of production of industrial firms exceeds
the social marginal cost of production, ql > , and industrial firms may therefore not
adopt the IT although this would be socially efficient. Economic policy can ensure
socially efficient industrialization by subsidizing intermediate-input purchases to the
point where the cost to buyers is equal to the social marginal cost of production. This
involves a subsidy s ql =-  per unit bought. Such a subsidy implies that the economy
will industrialize if and only if  (1,1) p = (1())(1)()0 sYsf qq ----> . Making use of (8)
therefore yields that the economy will achieve full industrialization if and only if
(1) YL > . Hence, the subsidy implies that the economy will industrialize if and only if
industrialization is socially efficient.
3.11 Input Chains, General Purpose Technologies, and Productivity
Input chains imply that technological improvements affecting many sectors
simultaneously, a new General Purpose Technology (GPT) for example, will have large
                                                  
10 The critical mass  ' n  is equal to the unique locally unstable equilibrium.25
effects on aggregate productivity if the IT is sufficiently intermediate-input intensive.
For example, suppose that an economy is in the FI-equilibrium, that the intermediate-
input intensity of the IT is 70 percent, and that a new GPT lowers the IT’s marginal
general-input requirement from  0.9 q = to  0.82 N q = . This amounts to a 10-percent
productivity-increase in sectors that adopt the new technology. Making use of (10)
yields that if the new technology is adopted in all sectors of the economy, then the
increase in aggregate productivity will be 26 percent. Interestingly, the implied increase
in aggregate productivity may be large even if only a small fraction of sectors adopt a
new GPT, as long as the adopting sectors are those furthest upstream. This result can be
established formally with the help of the next proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the economy is in the FI-equilibrium and that industrial
sectors upstream of  [ ] 0,1 u ˛  produce with a more efficient IT than firms downstream of
u . In particular, the marginal generalized-input requirement downstream of u  is q
while it is  N qq <  upstream of u . Then the average amount of labor required to produce
one additional unit of each good for consumption is
11 ()(1) N uuu
qbqb lll
-- =+- (18)
where  (1)/(1) NNN lqbqb =-- .
Proof: Denote with  ˆ (,) ymu  the additional production of good m  necessary to produce
one additional unit of each good  [ ] 0,1 m ˛  for consumption. Using the argument behind
(7) yields that  ˆ (,) ymu  satisfies  ˆˆ (,)/(,)/ ymumymum qb ¶¶=-  if mu >  and
ˆˆ (,)/(,)/ N ymumymum qb ¶¶=-  if mu £ .  Furthermore, using the argument behind (6)
yields  ˆ (1,)1 yu = . Integrating these equations implies that  ˆ (,) ymum
qb - =  for mu >  and
() ˆ (,)
NN ymuum
qqbqb -- =  if mu £ . The assumptions about the IT imply that each unit of
output requires  (1) qb - units of labor. Hence, the average amount of labor to produce
one additional unit of each good  [ ] 0,1 m ˛  for consumption is
1 11
0 ˆ (1)(,)(1) N ymudmuu
qbqb qbll
-- -=-+ ￿ . v
Evidently, the average amount of labor required to produce one additional unit of all
goods for consumption decreases and aggregate (marginal) productivity  ()1/() uu rl =
increases as the new, more efficient IT is introduced in upstream sectors. Furthermore,26
aggregate productivity is a concave function of u  with  '(0) r =¥ . Hence, the increase
in aggregate productivity is especially large when the more efficient technology is first
introduced upstream. To get a sense of the magnitudes involved it is useful to return to
the example where the intermediate-input intensity of the IT is 70 percent and the new
IT lowers the marginal general-input requirement from  0.9 q = to  0.82 N q = . Recall that
if all sectors adopt the new technology, then the aggregate productivity-increase is 26
percent in this case. The aggregate productivity-increase as a function of the fraction of
upstream sectors adopting the new IT is given in Table 5.
Table 5: Increase in Aggregate Productivity
Upstream Sectors Adopting New IT 0% 2% 4% 6% 10% 20%
Aggregate Productivity-Increase 0% 6.8% 8.5% 10.1% 12.2% 16.8%
Notes: Calculations use (18) and  0.7 b =,  0.9 q =, and  0.82 N q = .
The new technology will therefore raise aggregate productivity by 6.8 percent—more
than a quarter of the aggregate productivity-increase implied by adoption in all sectors—
even if it is adopted by only 2 percent of all sectors, as long as the adopting sectors are
those furthest upstream. If the upstream sectors adopting the new technology amount to
10 percent of all sectors, then the aggregate productivity-increase is more than 45
percent of the aggregate productivity-increase implied by full adoption.
4 Summary
The widespread adoption of increasing-returns-to-scale, industrial, technologies as a key
aspect of industrialization has been emphasized in both the theoretical and empirical
literature on industrialization. The theoretical literature has however neglected two
aspects stressed in the empirical literature.  First, industrial technologies are adopted
throughout input chains in the economy. Second, industrial technologies are more
intermediate-input intensive than the technologies they replace. This paper has analyzed
the implications of these two aspects of industrial technologies for industrialization. Two
interesting results emerged from the analysis. First, industrialization’s effect on
aggregate income and productivity may be large even if increasing returns at the firm
level are small. Second, minor improvements in the productivity of industrial
technologies may trigger full-scale industrialization and a large increase in aggregate27
income and productivity. This will be the case even if industrial firms coordinate their
decisions to adopt industrial technologies.28
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Appendix: Model where the Pre-Industrial Technology Uses Intermediate Inputs
The PIT for the good furthest upstream uses labor only and requires one unit of labor
for each unit of output produced. The PIT for goods  0 m >  is
log()loglog()(1)log()
PPP ymAzmlm aa =++- ,  01 a <£ , (A1)
where log A = log(1)log(1) aaaa ---- to ensure that prices of all intermediate inputs
will be identical in equilibrium;  ()
P zm  is the quantity of intermediate-input composites
used in the production of good m  with the PIT. This specification of the PIT implies
that the marginal and average cost of production of pre-industrial firms in sector m ,
()
P qm , is
0








Łł ￿ . (A2)
Definition of Equilibrium and Equilibrium Prices
Equilibria are defined as in the main text with the addition that the inputs demanded by
pre-industrial sectors must be profit-maximizing choices of pre-industrial firms.
To determine equilibrium prices, notice that (A1) and (1)-(3) in the main text
imply that industrial firms face unit-elastic consumption-demand and input-demand
functions. Hence, profit-maximization by industrial firms implies that—if industrial firms
produce—they will set the largest price at which they cannot be undercut by pre-
industrial firms in the same sector. The largest price at which industrial firms cannot be
undercut is the marginal cost of production of pre-industrial firms. Pre-industrial firms’
marginal cost of production can be determined recursively, starting with pre-industrial
firms in the sector furthest upstream. These firms require one unit of labor for each unit
of output and their marginal cost is therefore equal to the wage, which is normalized to
unity. As a result, the industrial firm furthest upstream will set its price equal to unity if
it produces,  (0)1
I p = . Now consider pre-industrial firms just downstream of sector
0 m = . Their marginal cost of production in (A2) is unity. The corresponding industrial
firm will therefore set its price equal to unity if it produces. Applying the same argument31
to firms further downstream yields  ()1
P qm =  in all sectors and  ()1
I pm =  in all industrial
sectors. Hence, equilibrium prices are equal to unity in all sectors.
Aggregate Income and Aggregate-Income Externalities
Demand for each good is derived as in the main text. The main difference is that (7) is
replaced by
((,))/if    (,)
(,)/      if     
        









where  (,)/ ymnm a  captures the intermediate-input demand of pre-industrial sectors.
Equation (6) in the main text is replaced by  (1,)() ynYn = , as only the good furthest
downstream is not used as an input in any other sector. Using the argument in the main





where l  is defined in (9) in the main text. Notice that  0 a >  implies that, compared to
the case where the PIT does not use intermediate inputs in (8),  greater weight is put on
the industrial labor requirement. This is because some of the inputs of pre-industrial
sectors are now produced with the IT. Aggregate income in the FI-equilibrium is
/ Lf l - .
Profits of the industrial firm furthest downstream when the n  sectors furthest
upstream have industrialized are
(,)(1)(,) nnynnf pqq =--, (A5)
where  (,) ynn , the demand for the good produced in sector n  when the n  sectors
furthest upstream have industrialized, is
(,)() ynnYnn a - = . (A6)
The expression corresponding to (13) is
( ) ( )  
11 ()(1)(1)(,)/(1) Ynynnfnn
aa alll
-- ¢ =---+- (A7)
with the interpretation given in the main text. The numerator of (A7) can be rewritten as
Direct Impact(,)/(1)()(,) nnynn lpqlba =+-- . (A8)32
Hence, there will be a positive income externality of industrialization only if ba > .
Equilibrium Industrialization
It follows directly from (A5) and (A6) that  0 a >  implies that  (0,0)0 p >  and hence that
there is no PI-equilibrium. This is because the input demand of pre-industrial firms
implies that demand for goods produced furthest upstream will always be large enough
for the IT to be profitable. The PI-equilibrium is replaced by the low-industrialization
equilibrium (LI-equilibrium) where all goods upstream (downstream) of some sector
(0,1) * n ˛  are produced with the IT (PIT).
The two main results are summarized next.
Proposition A1: If ab £ , then the equilibrium is unique and aggregate income is a
continuous function of structural parameters.
Proof: It follows from (A5)-(A8) that ba £  implies that if  (,)0 nn p < , then  (,)0 mm p <
for mn > . It is therefore natural to consider the following three cases separately to
prove uniqueness. First,  (,)0 nn p >  for all  (0,1) n ˛ , which implies that there is a unique
FI-equilibrium. Second, that  (,) nn p  becomes strictly negative for some  (0,1) n ˛ . In this
case there is a unique LI-equilibrium because  (,) nn p , once strictly negative, remains so
as n  increases. The third possibility is that  (,)0 nn p ‡  for all  (0,1) n ˛  and  (,)0 nn p =  for
some  (0,1) n ˛ . In this case, there would be multiple equilibria, a locally stable FI-
equilibrium and a locally unstable LI-equilibrium. To see that this is impossible notice
that (A4)-(A6) imply that there will be a locally unstable LI-equilibrium if and only if




is U-shaped. Furthermore, there will be a FI-equilibrium if and only if  (1)0 v ‡ . The FI-
equilibrium and the locally unstable LI-equilibrium will co-exist if and only if
min ()0 vn =  and 0argmin ()1 vn << . Straightforward algebra establishes that these
conditions can never be satisfied simultaneously if ba £ .
The LI-equilibrium and FI-equilibrium depend continuously on the structural parameters
of the model. Hence, for there to be a discontinuity, there must be structural parameters
where a small perturbation causes a jump from the LI-equilibrium to the FI-equilibrium33
or vice-versa. For this to be the case either (a) or (b) must hold: (a) min ()0 vn =  and
argmin ()1 vn < . In this case, there is a LI-equilibrium and a small perturbation of the
parameters such that min ()0 vn >  would cause the LI-equilibrium to disappear. But
min ()0 vn =  and argmin ()1 vn <  imply  (1)0 v >  and hence that there would also be a FI-
equilibrium. This is impossible as the equilibrium is unique. (b)  (1)0 v = . In this case,
there is a FI-equilibrium and a small perturbation of structural parameters such that
(1)0 v <  will cause the FI-equilibrium to disappear. If argmin ()1 vn ‡ , then the
equilibrium will go continuously from a FI-equilibrium to a LI-equilibrium as  () vn
depends continuously on the parameters and is U-shaped. If  (1)0 v =  and argmin ()1 vn < ,
then the equilibrium would jump from a FI-equilibrium to a LI-equilibrium. But these
conditions can never be satisfied simultaneously as the equilibrium is unique.  v
Proposition A2: If ba > , then there is a set of structural parameters for which there
will be multiple locally stable equilibria.
Proof: It is straightforward to show using (A5)-(A8) that there is at most one LI-
equilibrium. This implies that for there to be multiple locally stable equilibria, the locally
stable LI-equilibrium and FI-equilibrium must co-exist. This will be the case if  (1)0 v > ,
min ()0 vn < , and argmin ()1 vn < . It can be shown using (A9)-(A11) that there is a set of
structural parameters of strictly positive measure satisfying these conditions if and only if
ba > . v
When there are multiple equilibria, profits of industrial firms and aggregate income in the
FI-equilibrium are strictly greater than in the LI-equilibrium. It is therefore
straightforward to prove the equivalent of Proposition 1 for the model where the PIT
uses intermediate inputs if ba > .